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THE OLMSTEAD DECISION: THE ROAD TO
DIGNITY AND FREEDOM
Sylvia B. Caley* and Steven D. Caley'
INTRODUCTION
The history of discrimination in Georgia against persons with
mental disabilities is long and tragic. As early as 1845, the Georgia
legislature established the first institution for segregation of the
mentally disabled. It was described as the "Lunatic Asylum" for
"lunatics" and "idiots," who could be discharged only upon having
"recovered [their] senses."' The Georgia legislature passed
additional legislation in 1868 in which it found that persons with
mental disabilities were "either lunatics, idiots, epileptics, or
demented inebriates" who should be segregated as "inmates" in a
"lunatic asylum" as if they were common criminals.2  Society's
pernicious attitudes towards those with mental disabilities continued
unabated in Georgia at the turn of the twentieth century when the
Georgia legislature established the "Training School for Mental
Defectives" for the segregation and confinement of those who
"constitute[s] a menace to the happiness of himself or of others in the
community" because they were mentally defective at birth or became
"mentally defective" due to injury or accident . Not surprisingly,
given the attitudes at the time, the state termed such segregated
treatment of the mentally disabled as the state's "noblest charity.
' 4
* Assistant Clinical Professor, Co-Associate Director, HeLP Legal Services Clinic, Georgia State
University College of Law.
I Partner, Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, PC, lead counsel in Olmstead.
1. Lunatics Asylum, 1845 Ga. Laws 200, § 5, 204 ("No lunatic or epileptic, who shall have re-
covered his senses so as to go abroad without offence or terror to others, shall be discharged from the
asylum without suitable clothing ... ").
2. The Admission, Management and Discharge of Patients, 1868 Ga. Laws 268, § 1374, 268, 270
("Persons who may become inmates of said Asylum are either lunatics, idiots, epileptics, or demented
inebriates.").
3. Act Establishing Training School for Mental Defectives, 1919 Ga. Laws 377, § 3, at 379.
4. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, OcT. 23, 1902, Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess., at 47 (1902).
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In 1985, Justice Marshall aptly described such legislation as a
"regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation... that in its
virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst
excesses of Jim Crow." 5  As noted by Justice Marshall, blatant
discrimination and segregation against persons with mental
disabilities continued throughout the United States during the 1900s.
In 1973, the U. S. Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act6 in order to
address this discrimination. As noted by the Congress during the
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),7
however, the Rehabilitation Act and other legislation constituted a
"patchwork quilt in need of repair" with "holes in the fabric" and
"serious gaps in coverage that leave persons with disabilities without
adequate civil rights protections."8 The sad result was that persons
with disabilities were "still too often shut out of the economic and
social mainstream of American life."9 As Senator Lowell Weicker,
the original sponsor of the ADA, stated during consideration of the
ADA's passage: "Separate is not equal. It was not for blacks; it is not
for the disabled."' 0 Senator Edward Kennedy likened segregation of
persons with disabilities to an "American apartheid,"" and the
Congress repeatedly invoked Brown v. Board of Education 12 as a
basis for prohibiting segregation based upon disability.13
DEPLORABLE CONDITIONS CONTINUE IN GEORGIA
Shortly after Justice Marshall's opinion in the Cleburne case, in
1986, attorneys at the Atlanta Legal Aid Society established a mental
5. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 462 (1985) (Marshal, J., concurring and
dissenting in part).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
7. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327.
8. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 19 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,330.
9. Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the S.
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 195 (1989) (statement of Richard L. Thomburgh,
Att'y Gen. of the United States).
10. Id. at 215.
11. 135 CONG. REC. S4993, at 8514 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 26 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,448-49.
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health law unit to address the systematic state-sponsored segregation
and discrimination against persons with mental disabilities in
Georgia. Susan C. Jamieson, the founder of that unit has described
eloquently the deplorable conditions in Georgia's state-run
institutions:
State psychiatric facilities are shocking places. After twenty
years of visiting Georgia facilities, I am still shocked. I have
gotten used to the bleak environment. Over time, one adjusts to
the cold, the noise, and the smell, and many people who have
been admitted twenty or thirty times have gotten used to it, too.
But it is the chilling sameness of each individual's story that is so
troubling. Fear and a sense of dislocation are palpable. Every
conversation is heavy with exhaustion from the effort to preserve
a sense of dignity in a locked ward with strangers and from the
lack of energy that accompanies the drugs administered. There
is a deep sense of injustice that the law permits forced
segregation in an impersonal, violent place. Perhaps the worst
part of every story is the tedium and frustration that comes with
the repetitive daily routine. Even when the institution is a refuge
or a safe haven for a person, the fact remains that every day is a
desperate struggle to hold onto one's identity against all odds.1
4
Attorneys working with the mental health unit soon observed that
many persons requiring their representation either never received a
community placement or were caught in a revolving door of
institutionalization, which involved initial institutionalization,
discharge to a community setting with inadequate or nonexistent
support services, and re-institutionalization. In short, persons
14. Interview with Susan C. Jamieson, J.D. (Oct. 15, 2010). Ms. Jamieson is the former director of
the Mental Health Unit, Atlanta Legal Aid Society, and co-counsel in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581
(1999). Ms. Jamieson's observations have been confirmed by recent federal investigations of Georgia's
institutions which have documented numerous instances of barbaric treatment and suspicious deaths. As
a result, Georgia recently announced that it was shutting down all adult mental health services at Central
State Hospital in Milledgeville, an ancient institution established in the 1800s by the legislation
described above. See Craig Schneider, An Era Ends at Mental Facility, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 21,
2010, at Al.
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fortunate enough to obtain a community placement were set up for
failure from the outset.
Moreover, typical legal approaches did not work well. Most
lawsuits were brought under the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Rehabilitation Act. However, the courts found that the Fourteenth
Amendment merely required minimally adequate treatment and
habilitation as determined by the state's treating professionals whose
opinions were entitled to deference so long as they exercised
qualified professional judgment. 15 This state-friendly standard was
impossible to overcome in most cases. Cases under the
Rehabilitation Act typically floundered on the shoals of the Act's
requirement that there be discrimination based solely on disability'
6
and on the courts' otherwise narrow construction of the Act's
applicability. As a result, the mental health law unit decided it
needed to find a new approach to end unnecessary segregation of
persons with disabilities in institutions.
Their task was aided by their regular presence in the state's
institutions-they knew the staff and many of the patients.
Frequently, they had the opportunity to review and evaluate clients'
medical records, and over time they gleaned insight into what
treatment staff would recommend regarding the needs of various
patients. Based upon the judicial system's history of hostility and
fear of releasing mentally disabled persons from institutions and the
system's deference to the state's doctors, the attorneys decided that a
new legal approach would need to be made on behalf of an individual
who the state's treating doctors agreed was qualified to be placed in
the community.
Lois Curtis was just one such person. 17  She also was a good
example of the revolving door of institutionalization. Beginning in
the early 1990s, the mental health law unit represented her in many
15. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
16. The Rehabilitation Act actually used the now discredited term "handicap." The 1992
amendments substituted "a disability" for "handicaps" and "disability" for "handicap." Rehabilitation
Act Amendments, subsec. (a), § 102, 106 Stat. 4344, 4348 (1992) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
794 (2000)).
17. Lois Curtis eventually became the named plaintiff in the Olmstead v. L.C. decision.
[Vol. 26:3
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cases, including a case filed in Probate Court alleging a violation of
her right to appropriate treatment. Because she had a lawyer, Lois
was released from the institution, but she was placed in a personal
care home without adequate supports and where the provider was not
trained to assist persons with developmental and psychiatric
disabilities. Predictably, the placement failed, the provider could not
handle Lois' behavior, and Lois returned to the hospital. This
particular placement failure cemented the state's resolve that Lois'
proper place was in a state institution. Thus, the revolving door of
institutionalization that had been Lois' life for over ten years, since
she was fourteen years old, continued.
THE RoAD TO DIGNITY AND LIFE
In working through the process of identifying clients, developing
issues, and determining legal strategies, there is no substitute for
developing personal relationships, putting in the time to investigate
and understand the circumstances, and appreciating the physical and
political landscapes. The Olmstead experience provided poignant
learning lessons for the plaintiffs' litigation team-lessons that the
team members continue to carry with them.
As Lois' legal team evaluated new strategies to achieve an
appropriate, sustainable community placement for her, many of her
caregivers at the hospital acknowledged that institutionalization was
deleterious to Lois resulting in regressive behaviors. 18 The medical
facts were integral to the case. Lois Curtis was diagnosed as being
mildly mentally retarded and as having schizophrenia or a mood
disorder. Her first hospitalization was at age eight because her
mother could not control her and feared that Lois might hurt her
younger sister. Between 1980 and 1995, Lois accumulated 18
admissions to Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta (GRH-A).
During these admissions, Lois' life was monotonous, she rarely had
18. Affidavit of M. Cecelia Kimble, Ph.D., in support of Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction, L.C. v. Olmstead, No. :95-cv-1210-MHS, 1997 WL 148674 (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 26, 1997).
20101
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visitors, she never left the hospital grounds, and her greatest interest
was smoking cigarettes. While Lois spent extensive periods of her
life in institutions, her maladaptive behavior never was addressed
from a developmental disability perspective. Her frequent, long-term
periods of institutionalization further exacerbated her bad behavior.
She never learned to manage her behavior.
As the State came to understand that legal action would be pursued
on Lois' behalf, the State initiated plans first to send Lois to a day
program and later to discharge her into her mother's care. Placement
in the mother's home had failed numerous times in the past due to
lack of adequate community services and supports, so the legal team
held no expectation that revisiting this placement would meet with
any success. The hospital's continuing control over Lois' day-to-day
activities presented ongoing significant challenges for the legal team.
Eventually, because the State acknowledged that Lois was qualified
to be in the community, the team made the decision to file suit on her
behalf.
At the very outset, the team had to consider two primary, yet
potentially competing goals: obtaining the best possible outcome for
Lois while also obtaining an outcome that would force systemic
change so that neither Lois nor the hundreds of other similarly
affected individuals would ever be segregated and confined
unnecessarily again in the harsh and destructive environment of a
state facility. Filing the case as a class action was evaluated and
rejected because the facts of each case were unique and the service
needs of each person were individually specific. Furthermore, the
attorneys were mindful that the courts, even the federal courts, had
been especially hostile to class actions filed on behalf of persons with
mental disabilities. Finally, an important goal of the litigation was to
obtain a favorable precedent under a relatively new statute at the
time, the ADA, which would open the door and lay a strong
foundation for future, more expansive, advocacy.
The team made the difficult decision to file the first case on behalf
of an individual claimant rather than as a class action. The wisdom
of this decision later was confirmed at oral argument before the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. A turning point in the argument
[Vol 26:3
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occurred when Judge Barkett turned to her colleagues on the Court
and emphasized that this was not a class action, such that several of
the state's arguments, including its fundamental alteration argument
based on funding concerns, were irrelevant. The point was noted in
the Eleventh Circuit's written opinion.1 9  One other primary
consideration for the legal team was to file a case where availability
of community services would not be an issue. Thus, the legal team
decided to represent plaintiffs for whom community programs
already existed.
The litigation began with Lois Curtis, well known to the attorneys
of the mental health unit. Elaine Wilson later was joined as another
individual party to the lawsuit. Both of these women had dual
diagnoses of mental retardation and mental illness, and were
therefore eligible for the Mental Retardation Waiver Program
(MRWP), a funding mechanism available through the Georgia
Medicaid program that could be used to provide the community
supports required by both women. Georgia did not have a
comparable residential support program for persons diagnosed only
with mental illness. The availability of the MRWP extinguished any
argument that the litigants were seeking mandated services without a
funding source.
LANDMINES ALONG THE WAY
The new legal approach that the legal team decided to use was a
claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. After Lois had
sought representation and while the team was in the process of
preparing the foundation for their claim, the team had a lucky
break-the Third Circuit Court of Appeals handed down the first
favorable precedent under the ADA for persons with mental
disabilities in Helen L. v. Didario. Suit was filed on behalf of Lois
shortly thereafter.
19. See L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 905 n.10 (11 th Cir. 1998).
20. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
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Everyone knew that a fight was in store. Perhaps the realization
that the litigants were involved in a war became more apparent in
retrospect. Eight days after the lawsuit was filed in May 1995, and in
a blatant effort to torpedo the case, the state discharged Lois once
again from GRH-A to the care of her mother-only this time, the
discharge was for a two-week trial period with the intent of making it
final. This placement was inappropriate because since age 8, Lois
had not lived successfully with her mother. Like the other
placements in the past to her mother's home, this placement lacked
training for the mother and supportive services and community
resources for Lois. Not surprisingly, Lois' mother complained of
Lois' smoking, poor hygiene, and bad behavior. The placement was
doomed, and predictably it failed.
When the state proceeded to re-institutionalize Lois, her legal team
filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to require a proper
community placement. This motion was resolved with Lois'
admission to Brook Run, a less restrictive institutional setting than
GRH-A, and an agreement to prepare Lois for a full community
placement. Even though Lois did not need to be institutionalized, she
again found herself in an institutional setting because an appropriate
community placement plan did not exist. While at Brook Run, her
treatment staff developed a community placement plan. Even so, she
was not discharged to her community living situation until February
1996.
Elaine Wilson, diagnosed as mildly mentally retarded along with a
psychiatric diagnosis of personality disorder, lived in the same locked
ward at GRH-A with Lois. She had over 30 admissions to this
institution over a 20-year period. Her history of placements
following discharge from the institution included inappropriate
personal care homes and homeless shelters. For example, one
community provider believed that the appropriate habilitation for
Elaine was "to pray the demons out of her." During her many
admissions to GRH-A she was not evaluated, did not receive on-
going assessments, and no one trained in developmental disabilities
provided her care. People with developmental disabilities often
exhibit maladaptive behaviors which may be misunderstood by
[Vol. 26:3
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providers not trained appropriately. Elaine developed learned
dependence on the routines at GRH-A and exhibited frustration,
depression and hopelessness. The environment at GRH-A was
chaotic and complex, and the longer she remained, the more her
behavior deteriorated.
In addition to her developmental and mental health challenges,
Elaine battled many physical maladies. Perhaps worst among her
problems was advancing kidney disease. She was prescribed many
medications and experienced side-effects from these medications. In
early 1997, Elaine's kidney problems nearly scuttled her placement in
the community. Staying on top of the physical health challenges was
essential. In order to prevent further deterioration of Elaine's
condition, the legal team filed a motion for preliminary injunction on
her behalf to obtain the services she needed in a community setting.
Ultimately, Judge Marvin Shoob ruled in favor of Lois and Elaine
and found that: ". . . under the ADA, unnecessary institutional
segregation of the disabled constitutes discrimination per se, which
cannot be justified by a lack of funding." 21 Thus, Judge Shoob
required that the state provide Elaine with an appropriate community
placement and maintain Lois' community placement with appropriate
supportive services.
2 2
The State of Georgia appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. The panel
consisted of Judges Tjoflat, Barkett, and Propst. The oral argument
did not begin well as the first question from Judge Tjoflat suggested
that the State could not afford to provide funding for community
services, and, therefore, would not a ruling in favor of the Plainitiffs
result in a contempt action to throw state officials into jail? Although
the record showed that community services were cheaper to provide
than institutional services, Judge Tjoflat's funding concern found its
way into the Eleventh Circuit's decision.23 In affirming the district
court's opinion that the failure to provide community services for
qualified persons, such as Lois and Elaine, is discriminatory under
21. L.C. v. Olmstead, No. 1:95-cv-1210-MHS, 1997 WL 148674, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 1997).
22. Id. at "5.
23. SeeL.C., 138F.3dat905.
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the ADA, the Court did not outright affirm the district court.2 4 The
case was remanded for a determination regarding whether the State
could "prove that requiring it to make additional expenditures [for
Lois and Elaine] would be so unreasonable given the demands of the
State's mental health budget that it would fundamentally alter the
service it provides." 25 If the state could not show such a fundamental
alteration, the Eleventh Circuit held that the ADA would require
those expenditures.26
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
substantial part. It specifically held that "[u]njustified isolation... is
properly regarded as discrimination based on disability." 27  The
Supreme Court, however, found that the Eleventh Circuit's remand
instruction was "unduly restrictive" as follows:
In evaluating a State's fundamental alteration defense [the
funding issue], the District Court must consider, in view of the
resources available to the state, not only the cost of providing
community-based care to the litigants, but also the range of
services the state provides to others with mental disabilities, and
the state's obligation to mete out those services equitably.28
The Court's concern was based on the regulations under the ADA
which provide that the State must make reasonable modifications to
its programs to avoid discrimination unless those modifications entail
a fundamental alteration of the state's services. 29 The Court found
that, as a practical matter, a state would never be able to show a
fundamental alteration under the regulation if the "expense entailed
in placing one or two people in a community-based treatment
program is properly measured for reasonableness against the entire
mental health budget" as required by the Eleventh Circuit.
30
24. See id. at 895.
25. Id. at 905.
26. Id.
27. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999).
28. Id.
29. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1991).
30. Olmatead, 527 U.S. at 603.
[Vol. 26:3
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 660 2009-2010
660  I IT   I  ( l. :  
  ?4  
   
  it r s  
   
   
 ,,25    
,  t  
.2  
   '  
 l    j stified l tion .  
     ,,27  
t  '   
 i "  
  '    
  
 l    
it - sed f 
  
'   t ly.28 
'      
i  i  t t t  t t  t  l  ti s  
     
t l ti   '    
t t,   ti l tt ,  t t  l        
t l i      
   t - sed  
 i  l    l ss  
lt  budget" as required by the Eleventh Circuit.3o 
.  id.  . 
 .  
. . 
. l t  . . .,  . . ,  ). 
. I . 
.   . . .  . 0(b)(7) ( ). 
s  
10
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss3/4
THE OLMSTEAD DECISION
APPLICATION OF THE OLMSTEAD DECISION
Near the end of its opinion, the Supreme Court provided a specific
example of the intent of its holding with respect to the reasonable
modification regulation:
If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a
comprehensive effectively working plan for placing qualified
persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a
waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the
State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, the
reasonable-modifications standard would be met.3'
The Court further explained as follows:
In such circumstances, a court would have no warrant effectively
to order displacement of persons at the top of the community-
based treatment waiting list by individuals lower down who
commenced civil actions."
Based upon the above language, the Supreme Court carefully
qualified its holding that unnecessary institutionalization of the
disabled constitutes discrimination under the ADA.
We are now beyond the ten year anniversary of the Olmstead
decision and little has happened in Georgia and many other states to
develop a "comprehensive, effectively working plan" and a "waiting
list that move[s] at a reasonable pace." Persons with mental
disabilities continue to languish in dangerous and inhumane
institutions for many years. In many instances, no waiting lists exist
at all, let alone ones that move at a reasonable pace. A reasonable
pace simply does not mean confinement and segregation for several
years in the locked ward of an institution. In the words of Senator
Kennedy, it is time to end this "American apartheid."
31. Id. at 606.
32. Id.
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 661 2009-2010
) STEAD  661 
     
  t   





l   
'   
i i ti  1 
    
 , l  
  t   i
t  
 32 
     lly 
  li tion  
    
 r    
     
 i ,    
 l  ." l 
iti s      
i tit ti  f r  . I   i t ,  iti    
  le 
  t  i   
    r 
,  i an  
. [ .  
. / . 
11
Caley: The Olmstead Decision:  The Road to Dignity and Freedom
Published by Reading Room, 2010
662 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:3
A return to Fourteenth Amendment constitutional claims, as some
have suggested, is not the solution when the United States Supreme
Court is more conservative now than when it issued the failed
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence of Youngberg v. Romeo and its
progeny. Although the Olmstead decision is not a perfect one, in
states such as Georgia where little has been done, Olmstead still
holds great promise. In those states, enforcement actions under
Olmstead are long past due. It is time to act if Olmstead's original
promise is to be fully realized.
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